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[Sac. No. 7756. In Bank.

Dec. 16, 1966.]

JOHN P. SHIVELY et al, Petitioners, v. COLEMAN E.
STEWART,
Hearing Officer, etc., Respondent;
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Real Party in Interest.

as

[1] Administrative Law-Procedure-Witnesses-Requiring Attendance: Production of Evidence.-Gov. Code, § 11511, indicates that the Legislature expressly contemplated the use of
the subpoena power to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence at hearings of an administrative
agency.
[2] Id.-Procedure-Witnesses-DepositiollS.-'In authorizing the
taking of depositions when a witness will be unable to or
cannot be compelled to attend the hearing of an administrative
agency, Gov. Code, § 11511, provides for depositions, not for
discovery, but to secure evidence for use at the hearing.
[5] Id. - Procedure - DiscoveIT Proceedings. - The Legislature's
silence with respect to prehearing discovery in administrative
proceedings does not mean that it has rejected such discovery.
Instead it has left to the courts the question whether modern
concepts of administrative adjudication call for common law·
rules to permit and regulate the use of the agencies' subpoena
power to secure prehearing discovery.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, §§ 154,
155; Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 421.
licK. Dig. References: [1, 11] Administrative Law, § 103; [2]
Administrative Law, § 108; [3] Administrative Law, § 78; [4]
Physicians and Surgeons, § 21; [5-7] Physicians and Surgeons,
§ 22; [8-10] Administrative Law, § 104; [12] Administrative Law,
§ 104; Discovery, § 19(1); [13] Discovery, § 14; Physicians and
Surgeons, § 21; [14] Discovery, § 19(2); Physicians and Surgeons,
§ 21.
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[4] Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Proceedings.-The State Board of Medical Examiners has the resources of the state at its command to enable it to secure complete
information and to prepare its case before filing an accusation
in disciplinary proceedings. (Gov. Code, §§ 11180, 11181.)
[6] Id.-Susllension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Pro.
ceedings.-A disciplinary proceeding before the State Board of
Medical Examiners has a punitive character, for the agency
can prohibit an accused from practicing his profession.
[6] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Pro.
ceedings.-In a disciplinary proceeding before the State Board
of Medical Examiners, the agency is the accuser, a party to the
proceeding, and ultimately makes a decision on the record; its
concentration of functions calls for procedural safeguards.
[7] Id.-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Nature of Proceedings.-In a disciplinary proceeding before the State Board
of Medical Examiners, doctors accused of aiding, abetting,
attempting, offering to procure, and performing criminal abortions on named women on specified dates, are charged with
crimes and should have the same opportunity as in criminal
prosecutions to prepare their defense.
[8] Administrative Law - Procedure - Production of EvidenceEnforcement.-There is no administrative remedy for the
err9neous denial of a subpoena before an administrative hearing.
[9] Id. - Procedure - Production of Evidence - Enforcement. An administrative agency can move to quash, vacate, or modify
a subpoena in the superior court where the subject matter
sought is privileged or the subpoena is too broad.
[10] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence-Enforcement.-An
administrative agency does not pass on the scope of its adversary's subpoenas and need not assign hearing officers before
hearings have actually begun. It is only at the hearing that the
issuance of subpoenas is not mandatory, for a hearing officer is
then present who can determine, after hearing both sides,
whether a subpoena should issue.
[11] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence.-To compel the pro.
duction of items in connection with a hearing before an administrative agency, it is nQt necessary that the items sought
be admissible in evidence.
[12] Id.-Procedure-Production of Evidence-Enforcement: Discovery-Production of Documents-Showing Required.-When
the subpoena power of an administrative agency is invoked to
secure discovery, the good cause and materiality requirements
of Code Civ. Proc., § 1985, must be governed by discovery
standards.
[8] See Oal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law and Procedure, § 156•
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[13] Discovery-Production of Documents: Physicians- Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Proceedings.-Where the secretary of the State Board of Medical Examiners filed accusations against. doctors stating that they aided, abetted, attempted, offered to procure, and performed criminal abortions
on named women on specified dates, the doctors were entitled
to prehearing discovery of the statements of the women and
their husbands and to production of such of the doctors' bills,
letters and documents relating to the treatment given the
women as may be in the possession of the board's agents.
[14] Id.-Production of Documents-Showing Required: Physicians-Suspension and Revocation of Licenses-Proceedings.
-To secure discovery of information in an adversary's files,
there must be a showing of more than a wish for the benefit of
all the information therein; and where, in a disciplinary proceeding, doctors were accused of aiding and performing criminal abortions, they were not entitled to discover all reports
and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the
Board of Medical Examiners, absent some additional showing
of need and specificity. Being entitled to a reasonable opportunity to make such a showing, they may invoke the subpoena
power of Gov. Code, § 11510, to take depositions of the board's
attorney and exe~cutive secretary 10 determine whether good
cause exists for the production of other documents not privileged and not protected as an attorney's work product.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to obtain depositions and documents from
the Executive Secretary of the State Board of Medical Examiners and from the board's attorney prior to disciplinary hearings. Peremptory writ granted.
Lamb & Glynn, Robert L. Lamb and Robert J. Glynn, Jr.,
for Petitioners.
Zad Leavy and Herma Hill Kay as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Petitioners.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, E. G. Funke, Assistant
Attorney General, Gerald F. Carreras, L. Stephen Porter,
Warren H. Deering and Wiley W. Manuel, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondent and Real Party in Interest.
George R. Coan and Charles H. Bobby as Amici Curiae on
behalf of Respondent and Real Party in Interest.
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TRAYNOR, C, J.-Petitioners John P. Shively and Seymour Smith, licensed physicians authorized to practice medicine and surgery in the State of California, brought this proceeding to compel issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to obtain
depositions and documents from the Executive Secretary of
the State Board of Medical Examiners and from the board's
attorney prior to disciplinary hearings.
On May 20, 1966, Wallace W. Thompson, executive secretary
of the board, filed accusations against petitioners stating that
they aided, abetted, attempted, offered to procure, and performed criminal abortions on named women on specified dates.
The accusations initiated disciplinary proceedings that could
result in the revocation of petitioners' licenses to practice
medicine (Bus, & Prof. Code, § 2360; Gov. Code, § 11503).
Petitioners filed notices of defense and requested hearings.
(Gov. Code, § 11506,) On June 6 the board set Dr. Shively'S
hearing for July 25 and Dr. Smith's for July 27. (Gov. Code,
§ 11509,)
On June 27 petitioners presented four subpoenas duces
tecum to respondent hearing officer requesting prehearing
depositions and production of documents. By letter dated the
same day, the hearing officer refused to sign the SUbpoenas.
On june 30 petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate
in the superior court to compel issuance 0; the subpoenas, and
on July 14 that court denied the petition.
On July 22 petitioners filed a petition for an alternative
writ of mandate and a restraining order in this court. We
issued an alternative writ and stayed the administrative hearings pending final disposition of the writ proceeding.
The Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, §§ 1150111524), which was adopted in 1945 before pretrial discovery
became a legal norm, cont.:'1.ins no express provisions authorizing prehearing discovery in administrative proceedings. (See
generally Judicial Council of California, Tenth Biennial Report (1944); Comment, Discovery Prior to Administrative
Adjudications-A Statutory Proposal (1964) 52 Cal.L.Rev.
823.) [1] Although section 11510 of the Government Code
provides that "Before the hearing has commenced the agency
or the assigned hearing officer shall issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum at the request of any party . . . " (subd.
(a», section 11511 indicates that the Legislature expressly
contemplated the use of the subpoena power to secure the
attendance of witness('s and the production of evidence at
hearings. [2] Thus, in authorizing the taking of depositions
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when the witness will be unable to or cannot be compelled to
attend, section 11511 provides for depositions, not for the purpose of discovery, but to secure evidence for use at the hearing.
[3] The Legislature's silence with respect to prehearing
discovery in administrative proceedings does not mean, however, that it has rejected such discovery. Instead, as in the case
of criminal discovery (see Jones v. Super·ior Court, 58 Ca1.2d
56,58 [22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919, 96 A.L.R.2d 1213], and
cases cited), it has left to the courts the question whether
modern concepts of administrative adjudication call for common law rules to permit and regulate the use of the agencies'
subpoena power to secure prehearing discovery.
Statutory administrative procedures have been augmented
with common law rules whenever it appeared necessary to
promote fair hearings and effective judicial review. In Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Ca1.2d 260 [246 P.2d 656], we construed a statute requiring a licensing agency to "ascertain"
facts to require the agency to give notice and hold a hearing.
In English v. Oity 01 Long Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155 [217 P.2d 22,
18 A.L.R.2d 547], we augmented the applicable st~tutory rules
and required the agency involved to afford the! accused an
opportunity to rebut ex parte evidence before it. In Brotsky v.
State Bar, 57 Cal.2d 287 [19 Cal.Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94
A.L.R.2d 1310], we held that discovery was appropriate in
state bar disciplinary proceedings. These cases illustrate Professor Davis' observation that the law determining the adequacy of administrative hearings ' 'is mostly judge-made
law . . . " and "the standards are essentially the same
whether judges are giving content to due process, whether they
are giving meaning to inexplicit statutory provisions, or
whether they are developing a kind of common law." (Davis,
1 Administrative Law Treatise (1958) § 7.20, p. 506.)
We need not recanvass the arguments for and against attrial and pretrial discQvery in civil and criminal cases. We are
committed to the wisdom of discovery, by statute in civil cases
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2016-2036), and by common law in criminal cases. (Jones v. Superior Oourt, supra, 58 Cal.2d 56, 58,
and cases cited.) The criminal law analogy is appropriate
here. [4] The medical board has the resources of the state
at its command to enable it to secure complete information and
to prepare its case before filing an accusation. (Gov. Code,
§§ 11180-11181.) Such investigatory powers have been libera11y
construed. (Brovelli v. Superior Court, 56 Ca1.2d 524, 528-529
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[15 Cal. Rptr. 630, 364 P.2d 462] ; see Redding Pine Mills v.. ___ _
State Board of Equalizat'ion, 157 Cal.App.2d 40, 44 [320 P.2d
25] ; United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643
[94 L.Ed. 401,70 S.Ct. 357].) [5] A disciplinary proceeding has a punitive character, for the agency can prohibit an
accused f:.;:om practicing his profession. (See Reich, The New
Property (1964) 73 Yale L.J. 733, 751-755, 781, 784.)
[6] Since the agency is the accuser, a party to the proceeding, and ultimately makes a decision on the record, its concentration of functions calls for procedural safeguards. (Ibid., p.
752, fn. 97.) [7] Petitioners have been charged with crimes
and should have the same opportunity as in criminal prosecutions to prepare their defense. (See Funk v. Superior Oourt,
52 Ca1.2d 423, 424 [340 P.2d 593].) Moreover, when, as in this
case, a busy professional board must be assembled to hear the
charges, it is of the utmost importance that full preparation be
promoted so that needless continuances can be avoided.
The Attorney General contends that even if subpoenas duces
tecum should have issued to compel prehearing production of
documents and statements, the denial of the subpo~nas was an
interlocutory decision of an administrative agency that cannot
be reviewed until administrative remedies are exhausted. (See
Abelleira v. District Oourt of Appeal, 17 Ca1.2d 280, 292 [109'
P.2d 942,.132 A.L.R. 715].) [8] There is no administrative
remedy, however, for the erroneous denial of a subpoena before
a hearing. Section 11510 of the Government Code provides
that on proper application before the hearing subpoenas "shall
issue, " and whether subpoenas are sought for the production
of evidence at the hearing or to secure prehearing discovery,
their issuance is a ministerial act with respect to which the
agency or the hearing officer has no discretion. (Southern Pac.
00. v. Superior Oourt, 15 Ca1.2d 206, 210 [100 P.2d 302, 130
A.L.R. 323] ; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1986; Judicial Council of
California, Tenth Biennial Report (1944) 17-18.) [9] The
agency can move to quash, vacate, or modify the subpoena
in the superior court if the subject matter is privileged
or the subpoena is too broad. (Filipoff v. Superior Oourt,
56 Ca1.2d 443, 452 [15 Cal.Rptr. 139, 364 P.2d 315].)
[10] Thus, the agency does not pass on the scope of its
adversary's subpoenas and need not assign hearing officers
before hearings have actually begun. The procedure is similar
to that set forth in Government Code sections 11187-11189,
under which agencies must seek enforcement of their subpoenas in the superior court. It is only at the hearing that the
issuance of subpoenas is not mandatory (National Auto. &
)
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Ca.lf. Ins. Co. v. Garrison, 76 Cal.App.2d 415, 417 [173 P.2d
67] ), for a hearing officer is then present who can determine
after hearing both sides, whether or not a subpoena should
issue.
The Attorney General contends, however, that even if discovery is proper, the subpoenas duces tecum requested are so
broad that had they issued, they would be subject to a motion
to quash or modify in the superior court. Normally a motion to
quash or modify should be made in the superior court after
the subpoenas h.ave issued. Since the entire case is now before
us and the matter of the scope of the subpoenas has been fully
briefed, no purpose but delay would be served by refusing to
consider it. (See Hagan v. Superior Court, 53 Ca1.2d 498, 502
[348 P.2d 896], and cases cited.)
. Petitioners seek to subpoena (1) statements taken from the
women named in the accusations describing their care and
treatment and similar statements taken from their husbands;
(2) copies of petitioners' bills, letters, and documents with
respect to the treatment given the.. women; and ( 3) reports
and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the
board. In the affidavits in support of the subpoenas duces
tecum, petitioners declare that at the hearing the mental and
physical condition of the women, the intentions and acts of
petitioners, lL"Qd the necessity of the surgical procedures will be
in issue. They allege that all of the requested items will be
.admiesible in evidance.
:11] It is not llecessary that the items be admissible in
~vidence to compel their production.
[12] When the
agency's subpoena power is invoked to secure discovery, the
good cause and materiaiity requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1985 must be governed by discovery standards.
(Filipotl v. Superior Court, supra, 56 Ca1.2d 443, 449 [the
court equated the requirements for issuance of subpoenas
duces tecum with the requirements for motions for the production and inspection of documents under Code of Civil Procedure section 2031] ; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704,
709 [312 P.2d 698] ; Funk v. Superior Court, supra, 52 Ca1.2d
423.) In Funk we held that a defendant charged with criminal
abortion was entitled to pretrial discovery of statements the
alleged victims made to the police. [13] Petitioners are
therefore clearly entitled to prehearing discovery of the statements of the women and their husbands. Since petitioners also
allege that they do not have copies of the bills, letters, and
documentS referred to as item two, they are also entitled to
IS C.Id-li
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production of such of those documents as are in the possession
of the board's agents.
[14] With respect to item three, the applicable rule is that
to secure discovery, there must be a showing of more than a
wish for the benefit of all the information in the adversary's
files. (See West Pieo Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.
2d 407, 419 [15 Cal.Rptr. 119, 364 P.2d 295]; People V.--~
Cooper, 53 Ca1.2d 755, 770 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964] ;
Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Ca1.2d 159, 167-168 [49 Cal.
Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838].) Accordingly, in the absence of some
additional showing of need and specificity, petitioners are not
entitled to discovery of all of the reports and documents
gathered by investigators and employees of the board. Since
petitioners are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to make
such a showing, however, they may invoke the subpoena power
of section 11510 of the Government Code to take depositions of
the board's attorney and executive secretary to determine
whether there is "good cause" for the production of other
documents that are neither privileged nor protected as the
attorney's work product. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2016, subd.
(b), § 2036, subd. (a); Union Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 151
Cal.App.2d 286, 293 [311 P.2d 640].)
Let.a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondent to isSue subpoenas duces tecum for the production of any
statements made by women named in the accusations and their
husbands, and copies of petitioners' bills, letters, 'and documents with respect to the treatment given the women.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Peek, J.," concurred.
The petitions of the respondent and the real party in interest for a rehearing were denied January 10, 1967. Sullivan,
J., did not participate therein.

*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under aBsip.
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council

